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Competing Stories:
A Case Study of the Role of Narrative Reasoning
in Judicial Decisions
Kenneth D. Chestek*
Since 2007, the Applied Legal Storytelling (AppLS) movement has helped
scholars understand the role of stories in the legal system.1 AppLS2 scholarship differs from some of the more-familiar genres of “storytelling”
scholarship in that it focuses on the practical: how does storytelling (or
“narrative theory”) affect what lawyers and judges do in actual cases?3
Much, although certainly not all, of this rich body of scholarship
examines storytelling from the point of view of the client or the advocate.
That is, many scholars are investigating the characteristics of stories and
drawing conclusions about how advocates can best take advantage of
those characteristics, to tell effective stories on behalf of their clients.4

* © Kenneth D. Chestek 2012. Clinical Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis. This article is an
elaboration of the author’s presentation to the Third Applied Legal Storytelling Conference, Chapter 3: Trailblazing on the
Great Divide, held in July, 2011 at the University of Denver–Sturm College of Law. The author wishes to thank Profs. Ruth
Anne Robbins, Steve Johansen, Linda Edwards, Linda Berger, and Michael Smith for their helpful comments on early drafts
of this work, and my colleagues at IU-Indianapolis, who provided helpful comments following a colloquium while this paper
was being conceived. I also wish to thank my research assistant, Naima Solomon, J.D. Candidate in the Class of 2012 from
Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis, for her valuable assistance in the research into the cases I discuss in this
paper.
1 To date, there have been three international conferences devoted to the topic of Applied Legal Scholarship. The inaugural
conference was held in London, England, in July, 2007. It was followed by the “Chapter Two” conference in Portland, Oregon,
in July 2009, and “Chapter Three” in Denver, Colorado, in July, 2011. The conference is scheduled to return to London in July,
2013. Papers originally presented at these conferences have been published in many journals, but three peer-reviewed
journals have published “proceedings” issues collecting many of the papers presented at these conferences: Volume 41 of The
Law Teacher (published by the Association of Law Teachers based in the UK), Volume 14 of Legal Writing: The Journal of the
Legal Writing Institute and Volume 7 of The Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors. A more complete bibliography of the scholarship that has grown directly out of these conferences is attached as Appendix A.
2 Thanks to Derek Kiernan-Johnson and Ruth Anne Robbins for suggesting this abbreviation.
3 In addition to the articles collected in Appendix A, which grew directly out of the Applied Storytelling conferences, there
has been a recent surge in scholarship about in how lawyers use stories to represent clients. See e.g. Dana K. Cole,
Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the Story, 21 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne
Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact Sections, 32
Rutgers L. J. 459 (2001); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 Clinical L. Rev. 329 (2006);
Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” From the Outside: Using Case Theory to Tell the Stories of SexuallyHarassed Women, 14 Cardozo J. L. & Gender 61 (2007). The list could go on and on.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2151599
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But what is underdeveloped in this discussion so far is a careful
consideration of how stories may influence their intended audiences:
judges and juries. I broached this subject in 2009 when I conducted a
survey of appellate judges and asked them to read a pair of briefs on the
same side of a ﬁctional case, one of which limited itself strictly to logosbased reasoning and the second of which made the same logical
arguments but included a healthy dose of narrative-based persuasion,
principally through providing a great deal more context about how the
controversy affected the party ﬁling the brief. I was not surprised to ﬁnd
that a majority of judges and other readers reported that the brief that
included the backstory of the case was more persuasive.5 While that
ﬁnding is interesting, however, it does not address several deeper
questions: (1) exactly how do stories persuade judges, and (2) is it okay
that judges are persuaded by stories?
I believe that it is not only okay that judges pay attention to stories; it
is imperative that they do so. However, a thorough examination of that
normative issue is beyond the scope of this article.6 Instead, this article
begins to explore the ﬁrst question: How do stories work?7 In other words,
if all parties to any lawsuit follow the advice of the Applied Legal
Storytelling scholars and tell effective stories, how might a judge choose
between equally effective, but competing, stories?
In keeping with AppLS’s focus on practical applications of storytelling, my method in examining this question will be to examine the
recent spate of litigation over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care

4 See e.g. Appendix A, infra. Prof. Linda Edwards is one of the exceptions to this trend. She has recently been engaged in a
fascinating exploration of how narrative theory informs the law itself, helping to explain how law is created and evolves. See
generally Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 883 (2010) (hereinafter Once Upon a Time); Linda H. Edwards, Presentation, Battle and Betrayal, Tricksters and Champions: the Stories We
Tell about Law (Third Applied Legal Storytelling Conference, Denver, Colo., July 10, 2011).
5 See Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging By the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 1, 18–19 (2010).
6 That examination would require an examination of competing legal philosophies, from the legal positivist on one end of the
spectrum to the legal realists on the other and everything in between. For present purposes I will simply posit that narrative
reasoning is both legitimate and essential. It is legitimate in the sense that it connects legal decisionmaking to common sense,
something that is essential in order for law to retain its legitimacy in society. It is also legitimate in the sense that it is
completely normal. People think in stories all the time; it is the principal way humans derive meaning from what they
observe. And narrative reasoning is essential because if we deny judges the authority to engage in it, we are asking them to do
something unnatural: reason with only half their brains. Indeed, many rules of law (such as balancing tests) actually require
judges to engage in narrative reasoning.
For an interesting examination of the legitimate role of emotions in judicial decisionmaking, see Terry A. Mahoney,
The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 629, 630–31 (2011) (arguing that “[i]nsistence on
emotionless judging . . . is a cultural script of unusual longevity and potency,” but nevertheless “wrong as a matter of human
nature” and not universally shared).
7 I am only “beginning” this inquiry in the sense that I am mostly just seeking evidence that narrative reasoning can be
observed in the briefs and opinions ﬁled in the case. If, as I claim, the stories told by the parties had an actual impact on how
the judges decided the cases, the mechanism through which this persuasion took place involves a deeper examination of
cognitive science principles, which is beyond the scope of this article.
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Act (PPACA)8 and to look for evidence in both the parties’ briefs and the
trial judges’ opinions as to whether narrative reasoning was at work.
Shortly after President Obama signed the law, numerous legal challenges were ﬁled by conservative advocacy groups and a large group of
Republican state Attorneys General. The central legal issue in the case is
whether the law’s requirement that individuals purchase health insurance
or face a tax penalty exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause. This is a pure question of law, common to every case; yet some
trial courts found that Congress did have sufﬁcient power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the individual mandate, while others found the
mandate exceeded Congress’ power. Although the popular press seems to
have dismissed the differing results as simply a result of different political
leanings by the judges involved, the issue is far more complex. Indeed,
since the parties to the lawsuits told different stories in their briefs, it is
plausible that the different results might be due at least in part to the
different stories told.9
Part I of this article briefly reviews some of the foundational principles of narrative theory that are useful in studying the healthcare
litigation. Part II sets the stage for the study by describing generally the
broad reach of the litigation across the country. Part III takes a look at the
trial briefs ﬁled by the parties to the litigation to determine what story
they attempted to tell. Although study focuses on the trial court briefs and
decisions (because they are a larger data set), the article will occasionally
refer to some of the Court of Appeals decisions that have come down as of
this writing. I will not attempt to predict the outcome of the pending
Supreme Court appeal, since my purpose here is only to examine how
narrative may have influenced the trial court judges who had to decide
different iterations of essentially the same case.
Part IV then examines the opinions in the major cases and describes
how the cases were decided. Finally, Part V considers the possible role that
the different narrative choices might have played in reaching different
outcomes.

8 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Parts of the bill are codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2010); the individual
mandate, which is the primary focus of much of this litigation, is codiﬁed at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
9 In this article I am assuming that the merits of the legal rules here (principally the interpretation of the Commerce Clause)
are legitimately in dispute and that both sides have sound arguments to advance. My purpose is not to analyze the legal rules
but to discern, if possible, the role that narrative reasoning might have played in assisting the courts’ decisionmaking in these
cases.
In some ways, this study is like kibitzing a duplicate-bridge match: twelve groups are dealt identical hands, but choose
different strategies for playing the cards. Some strategies turn out to be more successful than others. Perhaps we can learn
some lessons about how the judges in these cases were persuaded by studying those strategies.
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I. A Brief Introduction to Narrative Reasoning
“Narrative reasoning” describes the norm-based argument or arguments
that motivate a judge to want to rule in a party’s favor.10 Narrative
reasoning is client-centered and very fact-oriented. Narrative reasoning
does not supplant the rule-based reason (the law) that allows the court to
rule in the client’s favor; rather, it provides a reason for the court to want
to rule in the client’s favor. Professor Richard Neumann calls rule-based
arguments “justifying arguments” and norm-based arguments “motivating
arguments.”11 If an advocate has both a strong justifying argument and an
appealing motivating argument, she is more likely to prevail than if she
had only a justifying argument.12
One particularly effective type of narrative reasoning is storytelling.13
Humans are hard-wired to think in story terms;14 much of what we learn
about the world is through our own experience of stories.15 But this raises
the question: What is a “story?” There are many different deﬁnitions, of
course, but the deﬁnition I will use for this exercise is this: “A characterbased and descriptive telling of a character’s efforts, over time, to
overcome obstacles and achieve a goal.”16
This deﬁnition identiﬁes three essential elements to any story: characters, goals, and obstacles to overcome.17 By comparing how the parties
portray their client(s) (the protagonists of the stories they tell), describing

10 See Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical
and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 Legal
Studies Forum 7, 11 (1996) (“Narrative reasoning evaluates a
litigant’s story against cultural narratives and the moral
values and themes these narratives encode.”). Prof. Chris
Rideout describes a similar concept as “narrative rationality.”
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality,
and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. Legal Writing 53 (2008).
11 Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal
Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style 309–11 (6th ed.,
Aspen Publishers 2009).
12 Id. See also Chestek, Judging By the Numbers, supra n. 5,
at 4–5. A motivating argument without a complementary
justifying argument is doomed to failure; a judge cannot rule
in favor of one party because she has a good feeling for that
party. The rules of law must also support that party’s
position.
13 Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law, supra n. 4, at 886
(citing Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of
Reality, 18 Critical Inquiry 1, 4, 10 (1991)).
14 Kendall Haven, Story Proof: the Science Behind the
Startling Power of Story 3–4 (Libraries Unlimited 2007)
(reporting numerous studies suggesting that humans have
told stories to each for 100,000 years and that stories are
universal throughout all cultures).

15 The philosopher John Locke expressed it this way:
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white
paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How
comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that
vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man
has painted on it with an almost endless variety?
Whence has it all the materials of reason and
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from
Experience.
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. II,
chap. 1, 26 (E.P. Dutton 1947). Prof. Michael Smith has
pointed out that each of us is a protagonist in our own life
story. Michael Smith, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and
Strategies in Persuasive Writing 33 (2d ed., Aspen 2008).
16 This deﬁnition is derived from one proposed by storyteller Kendall Haven in his book, Story Proof, supra n. 14, at
79. It has been modiﬁed to this formulation by Profs. Ruth
Anne Robbins, Steve Johansen, and me for a new legal
writing text, forthcoming from Aspen Publishers in 2013.
17 This is, of course, an oversimpliﬁcation, but for the
purpose of analyzing the stories told by the PPACA parties,
this simpliﬁed structure is sufﬁcient to compare the parties’
briefs. For a fuller treatment of how to incorporate a story
into a brief, see Ken Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The
Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. Legal Writing 127 (2008).
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the characters’18 goals and showing how they can overcome the obstacles
posed by the opposing party, one can discern a useful picture of the story
that each party chooses to tell.
A. Describing the protagonist: heroic archetypes
One useful way of thinking about the protagonist in a client’s story is by
analyzing heroic archetypes.19 Prof. Ruth Anne Robbins suggests that a
brief writer should consciously cast her client into the role of “hero” of the
story. Studies drawn on the work of Carl Jung,20 Joseph Campbell21 and
others have shown that humans in all cultures (even remote cultures with
little or no contact with outsiders), at every time in their history, instinctively recognize and respond to certain archetypal characters.22 These
characters create something of a standard list of possible protagonists:
types of people that most readers will unconsciously understand, identify
with, and root for.23 Because we innately understand and respond to these
hero types, they provide a powerful tool for persuasion.
Heroes, of course, don’t all look like Rambo; they come in all shapes
and sizes, with different strengths and weaknesses. They can appear as
Lovers, Magicians, Innocents, and a wide variety of other types.24 A
careful lawyer will analyze the available choices and make a conscious
decision to portray her client as one of these types; by so doing, she can
trigger automatic (and unconscious) responses in the judge’s mind by
creating a mental image of what a story featuring that particular kind of
hero probably looks like, and how it is likely to turn out.25

18 In our deﬁnition of “story,” the term “character” is meant to refer to the main character in the story: the person (or entity)
the storyteller wants the reader to root for. Since this is synonymous with the term “protagonist,” I will use the more speciﬁc
term “protagonist” in referring to the main character in the story (the lawyer’s client). Note, however, that most stories have
additional characters: antagonists, minor characters, etc.
19 Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm
of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767 (2006).
20 Jung describes a “collective unconscious,” made up of archetypes, which humans are born with. “The concept of archetype
. . . indicates the existence of deﬁnite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and everywhere. Mythological
research calls them ‘motifs.’” Carl G. Jung, The Portable Jung 59–60 (Joseph Campbell ed., Penguin Books 1976).
21 See generally Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton U. Press 1949).
22 Robbins, supra n. 19, at 773–74, In particular, “Campbell believed that within all of the world’s mythologies there are
heroes whose journeys follow a predictable pattern. He opined that the storytellers of the different eras and cultures were
trying to tell us, through symbolism and metaphor, of our own journeys towards individuation.” Id. at 774.
23 But each of the “heroic” archetypes has a “shadow” side. Just as every hero in literature has a tragic flaw, each type of hero
has a tendency toward self-defeating or destructive behavior. See e.g. Dean Miller, The Epic Hero 62 (Johns Hopkins U. Press
2000).
24 Robbins, supra n. 19, at 778–79. The twelve archetypes that Prof. Robbins cites are Warrior, Creator, Caregiver/Martyr,
Every person/Orphan, Outlaw/Destroyer, Sage, Explorer/Wanderer/Seeker, Magician, Ruler, Lover, Jester/Fool, and Innocent.
Id.
25 Id. at 769.
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Such archetypes have been described as “inner guides” that are
present within each of us.26 Each of us is on a quest to ﬁnd meaning and
purpose, and each of these archetypes can be invoked at various stages of
our lives to assist us on our journey.27 Importantly, since these archetypes
are innately human, stories that evoke these archetypes resonate with
audiences at a subconscious level. If the story describes how one of the
heroic archetypes is likely to behave, it will feel true at a “gut” level.
Therefore, choosing a plausible heroic archetype to portray the client
helps the writer tell a credible story, more likely to resonate with the
audience.28
B. The hero’s journey
While there are many different types of heroes, all heroes share some
features. One such shared characteristic is the hero’s quest.29 The quest is
“a journey we each take to transform ourselves as individuals,” or potentially to transform society.30 In terms of our deﬁnition of story, this equates
to the “goal” that each character seeks.
All journeys have three phases: preparation, the journey itself, and the
return.31 This sequence forms essentially the same arc as the plot of a
story: a preexisting state of tranquility (preparation), followed by conflict
and efforts to resolve the conflict (the journey). The story ends with either
a reinstated or a transformed condition of tranquility (the return).32
C. The obstacle
The third major part of this deﬁnition of a “story” is that the character
must struggle to overcome some obstacle.33 Though there can be many
kinds of potential obstacles, in the context of litigation the obstacle is
commonly another person or institution (the opposing party or parties).

26 Carol S. Pearson, Awakening the Heroes Within: Twelve Archetypes to Help Us Find Ourselves and Transform Our World
5–6 (HarperCollins 1991) (cited in Robbins, supra n. 19).
27 Id. at 7–8.
28 For an expansion on some of these heroic archetypes, see infra sec. III.
29 Robbins, supra n. 19, at 790–91; Pearson, supra n. 26, at 3–4.
30 See Robbins, supra n. 19, at 790–91.
31 Pearson, supra n. 26, at 8–12.
32 See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 113–14 (Harv. U. Press 2000); see also Chestek, Plot
Thickens, supra n. 17, at 147.
33 Prof. Robbins sometimes uses the terms “villains” and “dragons” as synonyms to describe the obstacle that the hero must
overcome. See e.g. Robbins, supra n. 19, at 786. I will distinguish between these terms. I use the term “dragon” as a broader
term encompassing a variety of potential obstacles, including villains, gatekeepers, internal obstacles, and systemic obstacles.
A “villain,” on the other hand, is a speciﬁc type of dragon that embodies pure evil.
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But other possible obstacles could be internal or systemic impediments or
failings.
Persons or institutions as obstacles can be thought of as other characters in the story: the antagonist(s). But antagonists come in various
forms as well. For example, overzealous counsel may choose to cast the
antagonist in the role of the evil Villain. It is tempting to cast one’s client’s
adversary as a purely (or, at least primarily) evil person or institution, with
no redeeming characteristics (think Lord Voldemort); indeed, some clients
expect lawyers to demonize the opposition in this manner. But purely evil
characters are almost entirely ﬁctional; in the real world, almost all
defendants have redeeming qualities. Therefore, a more credible role for a
defendant–antagonist would be that of a Threshold Guardian (or
Gatekeeper). Threshold Guardians are not evil;
they just have their own goals, which conflict
Obstacle Types
with those of the protagonist.34
But the obstacle need not be an antagonist Antagonist (another character or
characters who oppose the hero)
character at all; the obstacle can instead be
• Villains (characters who oppose
internal (such as an addiction, a health issue, or
the hero out of animus or an evil
emotional struggles)35 or systemic (for example,
nature)
a legal rule that prevents the protagonist from • Threshold Guardians (characters
achieving his or her goal). In short, anything
who are not evil but who simply
have
different goals which
that tends to inhibit the protagonist from
impede the hero's quest)
achieving his or her goal can be characterized
Internal obstacle (such as
as an obstacle.
addiction, physical or mental
A visual depiction of the possible obstacles
health issues, emotional struggles,
a protagonist might face is shown in the sidebar etc.)
“Obstacle Types.”
Systemic obstacle (such as
All of these concepts will become useful in structure of society or social norms,
analyzing the stories told by the various parties unfavorable legal
to the PPACA litigation.

II. The Major Challenges to the PPACA: Choosing
Cases with Stories to Tell
The PPACA36 is highly complex and lengthy. It attempts to implement
a comprehensive reform of the way healthcare services are provided to
Americans, including speciﬁc efforts to provide healthcare insurance to

34 See id. at 788.
35 Id. at 786.
36 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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many currently uninsured citizens. The bill does many things,37 but the
most controversial provision is a requirement that most individuals (with
limited exceptions for certain people with religious objections or financial
hardship) purchase health insurance or pay a tax penalty if they choose
not to do so (the “individual mandate”).38 The law was challenged immediately in numerous lawsuits around the country. At least one suit was
filed before President Obama even signed the law,39 while several others
were filed the day he signed the law.40
I examined all of the PPACA cases to date to determine what story (or
stories) the parties were telling. I chose to study the trial court opinions in
the major cases challenging the law, partly because at the trial level the
facts of the case are most fluid, and in theory storytelling would seem to
have the most room to work.41 But I also chose to study the trial court
opinions in order to have a larger data set, since there are simply more
cases at that level than at the appellate level. However, as of the time this
article was completed, seven of the twelve cases I studied had been
reviewed by different United States Courts of Appeals;42 I will refer
to some of those appellate decisions from time to time throughout
the Article.
My initial review of cases involving some form of challenge to PPACA
turned up sixteen reported decisions. Of these, I discarded several from
the data set as not being serious challenges to the statute.43 Other cases

37 The law amends numerous previous Acts of Congress, most notably the Public Service Health Act, the Social Security
Act, and the Internal Revenue Code. Among the most important provisions of the Act are a prohibition of insurance
companies rejecting applicants because of preexisting medical conditions; creation of “health insurance exchanges” in every
state to assist individuals and employers in purchasing insurance and comparing rates; a requirement for certain employers
to provide health care insurance to its employees or pay a tax penalty if it chooses not to (the “employer mandate”); and the
“individual mandate” requiring people who are not covered by employer plans to acquire health insurance. See id.
38 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
39 The bill was signed on March 23, 2010. Orly Taitz filed an amended complaint in her pending lawsuit challenging
President Obama’s qualifications for office on March 22, 2010, adding the claim that Obama would not have authority to sign
PPACA into law since he could not prove he was legally entitled to hold the office of President. See Pl.’s 1st Amend. Compl.,
Taitz v. Obama, 2010 WL 1859343 (D.D.C. March 22, 2010). This case was ultimately dismissed by the trial court and was not
included in this study.
40 See e.g. Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.
2011). The district court in Florida ex rel. Bondi noted that “[t]his case, challenging the Constitutionality of the Act, was filed
minutes after the President signed [it]”. 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
41 Of course, storytelling can be effective at the appellate level as well, as I have argued elsewhere. See Chestek, The Plot
Thickens, supra n. 17; Chestek, Judging By the Numbers, supra n. 5. Many other scholars also focus on appellate briefs and the
stories they tell; see, e.g., Edwards, Once Upon a Time, supra n. 4, at 885; Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy:
100 Years of Brief-Writing Advice, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 1 (2010).
42 Four Courts of Appeals affirmed the trial court decisions.: Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); N. J. Phys., Inc. v. Obama, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Liberty University v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011). One case was
vacated and remanded to the trial court. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). The United States
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in another case. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 132
S. Ct. 604 (2011). The decision in that case is likely to be filed shortly before this Article appears in print.
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involved limited challenges to specific parts of the statute and not a facial
attack on the entire statute,44 or had not yet been decided on the merits. I
ended up with twelve cases that made facial challenges to the statute and
that had resulted in some significant decision by a trial judge.
The issues raised by these cases vary. In reading the briefs, I counted
at least nineteen separate issues raised by at least one litigant. Most of
these involved different legal theories raised by the plaintiffs, ranging from
claims that PPACA exceeded the powers of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, to substantive due process issues, separation of powers claims,
and several claims of infringement of religious liberty under the First
Amendment. For its part, the United States commonly raised at least three
defensive issues: (1) that the plaintiffs lacked a particularized, certain
injury and therefore lacked standing to sue; (2) that the statute did not go
completely into effect until 2014, and the claim was therefore unripe; and
(3) that the individual mandate was enforced by a tax provision, so the
suits were barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.45
In almost every case, the defendants filed motions to dismiss based on
the three defenses listed. No trial court ruled in favor of the government
on either the ripeness or the Anti-Injunction Act issues.46 However, the
courts reached different results on the standing issue, so it became interesting to study the twelve cases to see why this occurred.
In addition, six cases that resolved the standing issue in favor of the
plaintiffs went on to address the substantive Commerce Clause issue.
These cases also split, with three cases finding that the statute was a valid
exercise of Congress’ power under that clause, and three finding the
statute unconstitutional under that clause.47
Since the standing and Commerce Clause issues were the only issues
common to all twelve major cases, I decided to study those cases to see if I
could discern any patterns in the stories the parties told, or the rationales
used by the courts in their decisions. The twelve cases are summarized in
Table 1; they will be discussed in more detail on the next page.

43 As noted in n. 42, supra, the first case to challenge the law was based on a theory that since President Obama could not
prove that he was actually born in the United States, he did not have legitimate authority to sign the bill into law. Taitz v.
Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1. Also, a group of physicians challenged the law on the basis of alleged ultra vires conduct by
President Obama in “coercing” Sen. Ben Nelson to vote in favor of the bill, violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
Anderson v. Obama, 2010 WL 3000765 (D. Md. 2010). Both of these cases were quickly dismissed by the courts, and not
considered in this study.
44 See e.g. Phys. Hosp. of America v. Sebelius, 707 F. Supp. 2d 828 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
45 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006).
46 However, the Fourth Circuit did find the Anti-Injunction Act argument persuasive and upheld the dismissal of one of the
private party lawsuits on that basis, even though the trial court had not ruled on that issue. Liberty University v. Geithner, 671
F.3d at 401–15.
47 Since these are the only cases that reached the substantive Commerce Clause issue, they are the cases that have received
of the mainstream media attention.
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Table 1: List of PPACA Cases, Trial Judges, and Results
(As of December 2011)

Case
Name

Date of
Trial Court
Decision

Trial
Judge

App’ting
President

Trial
Result

Result
Date of
on Appeal Appellate
Decision

Cases Decided on Standing Issue (in chronological order)
Baldwin v.
Sebelius, 2010
WL 3418436
(S.D. Cal. 2010)

Aug. 27,
2010

Dana
Sabraw

G.W.
Bush

No
Standing

Aff’d 654
F.3d 877

Shreeve v.
Obama, 2010
Wl 4628177
(E.D. Tenn 2010)

Nov. 4,
2010

Curtis
Collier

Clinton

No
Standing

n/a

N.J. Phys. Assoc
v. Obama,
757 F. Supp.
2d 502 (D. N.J. 2010)

Dec. 8
2010

Susan
Wigenton

G.W.
Bush

No
Standing

U.S. Citizens
Assoc. v. Sebelius
754 F. Supp. 2d
903 (N.D. Ohio 2011)

Feb. 28,
2011

David
Dowd Jr.

Reagan

Standing48

n/a

Bryant v. Holder
809 F. Supp. 2d 563
(S.D. Miss. 2011)49

Aug. 29,
2011

Keith
Starrett

G.W.
Bush

Standing

n/a

Butler v. Obama
814 F. Supp. 2d 230
(E.D. N.Y. 2011)

Sept. 30,
2011

Joseph F.
Bianco

G.W.
Bush

No

n/a

Aug. 12,
2011

Aff’d 653
Aug. 3,
F.3d 234
2011
(3d Cir. 2011)

Cases Decided on Commerce Clause Issue (in chronological order)50
Thomas More
Ctr. v. Obama,
720 F. Supp. 2d 882
(E.D. Mich 2010)

Oct. 7,
2010

George C.
Steeh

Clinton

Constitutional

Aff’d 651 June 11,
F.3d 529
2011
(6th Cir. 2011)

Liberty University
v. Geithner, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 611
(W.D. Va. 2010)

Nov. 30,
2010

Norman K.
Moon

Clinton

Constitutional

Vacated,2011 Sept. 8
WL 3962915 2011
(4th Cir. 2011)51

48 On July 1, 2011, Judge Dowd granted summary judgment to the United States on the Commerce Clause issue on basis of
Thomas More Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Circuit 2011). Since the judge did no more than note that the Sixth Circuit
opinion was binding authority and engaged in no further analysis, I have left this case in the category of “cases decided on
standing issue.”
49 The court initially dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. Bryant v. Holder, 2011 WL 710693 (E.D. N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2011). However, the court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, and later found that their Second Amended
Petition did allege a sufficiently particularized and certain injury to confer standing on the Plaintiffs to maintain their cause
of action.
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Virginia ex rel
Cuccinelli v. Sebelious
728 F. Supp. 2d 768
(E.D. Va. 2010)

Dec. 13,
2010

Henry
Hudson

G.W.
Bush

Unconstitutional

Vacated, 656 Sept. 8,
F.3d 253
2011
(4th Cir. 2011)52

Florida ex rel. Bondi
Jan. 31,
v. Sebelius, 780 F. Supp. 2011
2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011)

Roger
Vinson

Reagan

Unconstitutional

Aff’d, 648 Aug. 12,
F.3d 1235
2011
(11th Cir. 2011)

Mead v. Holder
766 F. Supp. 2d 16
(D. DC 2011)

Gladys
Kessler

Clinton

Constiutional

Chrisopher
Conner

G.W.
Bush

Unconstitutional

Feb .22,
2011

Goudy-Bachman v.
Sept. 13,
U.S. Dept. of Health
2011
Human Services, 811 F.
Supp. 2d 1086 (M.D. Pa. 2011)

Aff’d sub nom Nov. 8,
Seven-Sky v. 2011
Holder, 661 F.
3d 1 (D. DC 2011)
n/a

III. Telling the Clients’ Stories
Since stories require protagonists, the first thing I did in examining the
twelve cases was to see whether there were commonalities among the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs could be grouped into three main categories:
(1) private individuals (health-care consumers) and their employers,53
(2) physicians and advocacy groups for physicians,54 and (3) state
governments.55 The defendants varied from case to case, but generally

50 The six cases listed in Table 1 that were resolved on the basis of the Commerce Clause reveal a pattern that some in the
media have latched on to as an “explanation” for why they reached different results: the three cases ruling that the law was
constitutional were decided by judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, while the three cases which ruled the law unconstitutional were decided by judges appointed by Republican Presidents. Actually, the mainstream media focused on just the
first five cases on the list, since they were all decided before the various Courts of Appeal began resolving the appeals. The
sixth case on the list, Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, was not decided until September 13, 2011,
after three different Courts of Appeal had ruled. Accordingly, that case received very little media attention when it was
decided. It does, however, follow the supposed “pattern” of judges’ political party bias. Regardless of basis, the political bias
explanation is superficial and almost certainly incomplete. See infra n. 115 and accompanying text.
51 The court vacated and remanded the case to the trial court on basis that Anti-Injunction Act barred any enforcement
prior to the levy of the tax designed to enforce the provisions of PPACA.
52 The court vacated and remanded the case to the trial court on the basis that the Commonwealth of Virginia lacked
standing to challenge the individual mandate of the law.
53 This is the largest group, and includes nine of the twelve cases in the study: Baldwin v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D.
Cal. 2010); Shreeve v. Obama, 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 764 F. Supp. 2d 684 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. 2011); U.S. Citizens Assoc. v.
Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich 2010), aff ’d
651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp.
2d 16 (D. D.C. 2011); and Butler v. Obama, 814 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).
54 The only case in the study group filed by a group of physicians is N.J. Phys. Assoc. v. Obama. Another case filed by a group
of physicians was excluded from the study since it made an as applied claim against only a portion of the statute relating to
billing procedures for physicians: Phys. Hosp. of America v. Sebelius.
55 This group includes two cases: Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius and Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. Of Health and
Human Services. The latter case includes twenty-six states, through their Attorneys General (all Republican), as well as a few
individuals, as plaintiffs.
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included the United States Department of Health and Human Services; its
Secretary, Kathleen Sebelius; Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
(because the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate is a tax
penalty); and in a few cases, President Barrack Obama. Yet this group of
defendants told a uniﬁed story, since in most of the cases that reached the
Commerce Clause issue, and most of the cases that ended with rulings on
the standing issue only, a core group of attorneys from the Justice
Department collaborated on the briefs.56
The stories told by each group of plaintiffs are counterpoised below to
that told by the United States. For each, the brief champions a particular
protagonist and presents that protagonist’s goal and the obstacles (antagonists, systemic, or other) preventing the protagonist from achieving that
goal. Each protagonist corresponds to a heroic archetype. Comparing the
three different plaintiff stories to the defendants’ story may help explain
why the cases reached different results.
A. Physician stories
Only one case in the study group was ﬁled by
physicians. It can be summarized in the sidebar
“Physician Stories.”
1. Protagonist

Physician Stories
Protagonist(s) Physicians’ association, an individual physician,
and a patient of that physician.
Heroic type: Outlaw

The ﬁrst task in examining a narrative is to Goal(s) To preserve the existing
determine who the protagonist is. What business model of patients
character or institution does the author want us contracting directly with physicians
and not dealing with insurance
to root for? It is not always obvious.
companies
In this case, the caption of the complaint
Obstacle(s) (1) Systemic (indilists, in order, the New Jersey Physicians, Inc. vidual mandate of PPACA); (2)
(described in the principal brief as “a Antagonist (Congress as Villain)
physicians’ advocacy organization), Dr. Mario
A. Criscito (an individual physician), and “Patient Roe.” Little detail is
provided as to Patient Roe’s identity, much less his objective. The
plaintiffs’ brief says only that “[t]he mandate [of the law] will force him to
have qualifying health insurance, even though he does not have it and does
not want it. Thus, he will be forced to enter into a transaction he does not
want, or face monetary penalties.”57 The brief does a better job explaining
what the physicians object to: the Act “will have a direct, substantial

56 In the cases for which briefs are available on Westlaw, three attorneys signed on behalf of the government in all of the
cases decided on the Commerce Clause issue as well as in most of the briefs decided on standing: Assistant Attorney General
Tony West, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ian Heath Gershengorn, and Sheila Lieber. Attorney Jennifer Rivera also
signed most of the briefs. Briefs were not available on Westlaw for all of the cases resolved on the standing issue.
57 Pl. Brief in Opposition to Def. Mot. to Dismiss, N.J. Phys., Inc. v. Obama, 2010 WL 4597787 at 7 (August 23, 2010).
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impact upon Dr. Criscito’s medical practice, the manner in which he may,
or may not, seek payment for his professional services and the manner in
which he may render treatment to his patients.”58 As for the physician’s
organization, it “seeks to protect[] the professional and economic interests
of it[s] physician members and, indeed, all of New Jersey’s physicians, are
germane to New Jersey Physicians’ purpose as a physician advocacy
organization.”59 It also claims that “Dr. Criscito, and many of New Jersey
Physicians’ members, accept direct payments from patients, and will not
be able to do so once the mandate goes into effect.”60 However, it does not
cite any provision of the Act which so holds.61
Since the physicians’ organization and Dr. Criscito’s goals are
described more fully, one is left with the impression that main protagonists in the case are the physicians; the anonymous plaintiff is probably
included as a hedge to insure that somebody in the case has standing. As
such, Patient Roe is relegated essentially to the role of a helper, or
“companion;”62 the story is really about the physicians’ struggle to preserve
the existing business model for the practice of medicine.
2. Goal

Having identiﬁed the principal protagonist in the story, identifying the
heroic archetype that the advocates choose for their clients can help us
determine how the stories of the different parties might be viewed by the
reader—the court. Identifying the archetype can be tricky, however, since
many of the twelve types seem to overlap. One way of distinguishing
between heroic archetypes is to examine the protagonist’s quest, or goal.
In the case of the physicians, two likely heroic archetypes might apply:
the Warrior and the Outlaw. A Warrior’s quest is to “ﬁght . . . for just
causes/important issue.”63 A Warrior’s quest is thus externally oriented; he
ﬁghts for a principle because it helps others. An Outlaw’s quest, by
contrast, is more self-interested; he seeks to destroy what he perceives as
not working, or that which interferes with his personal autonomy.64

58 Id.
59 Id. at 9.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Probably because the Act says no such thing. See text accompanying note X, infra.
62 See Robbins, supra n. 19, at 790 (describing the role of the companion).
63 Id. at 802.
64 Pearson’s term for “Outlaw” hero is a “Destroyer” hero. See Pearson, supra n. 26, at 136. She says this type of hero is often
evoked within each of us “by a sense of powerlessness, the discovery that everything you have counted on, worked toward, or
tried to build in life has come to nothing. It can be an encounter with injustice. You have been good, disciplined, hardworking, and loving, and in return you get kicked in the teeth.” Id. at 136–37. It is not hard to imagine the plaintiffs in this
case believing themselves to having been “kicked in the teeth” by what they perceive as an unjust intrusion into their private
affairs by the government, thus calling forth the Destroyer (Outlaw) hero within them.
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Given the essentially self-interested nature of the physicians’ quest,
the most logical heroic type that describes the physicians is an Outlaw
hero. In the protagonists’ eyes, “what is not working” is the law itself, since
it allegedly prevents them from pursuing their preferred method of doing
business. A quest of allowing physicians to continue to make lots of money
by preserving the existing business model is not externally oriented (i.e.,
the quest helps the protagonists themselves, not others), so the Warrior
archetype does not seem to ﬁt.
3. Obstacle

Several obstacles are possible in this story. The obvious obstacle is a
systemic one: the PPACA itself. And, indeed, the physicians’ brief does
attack the statute on its face. But the plaintiffs are not content to simply
attack the statute. Instead, the brief includes some very broad attacks on
Congress itself.65 The sometimes hyperbolic rhetoric66 leads one to
conclude that Congress is purely evil: a quintessential Villain.
B. The private individuals and
employers’ story
Since there were eight different cases in
this category, it is somewhat difﬁcult to
generalize about the stories told by the
private individuals and employers. But
the plaintiffs’ briefs in the three privateindividual cases decided on the
Commerce Clause issue told a pretty

Individual and Employer Stories
Protagonist(s) Mostly private individuals,
plus a few private employers and a public
interest law firm. Heroic type: Outlaw
Goal(s) Individual plaintiffs don’t have
insurance, don’t qualify for a religious
exception or for financial assistance to
purchase insurance, and don’t want to have
to buy insurance.
Obstacle(s) (1) Systemic (individual
mandate of PPACA); (2) Antagonist
(Congress as Villain)

65 For example, in asserting that the PPACA is outside of the reach of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, the
plaintiffs write,
Of course, the defendants’ reasoning could be used to support any exercise of Congressional power, at all, no matter
how far-reaching or attenuated, as long as one could posit a link between a governmental interest and some form of
economic activity (or inactivity). For example, Congress could deem the viability of the American automobile industry
essential to the economic health of the nation, particularly as the federal government now owns a sixty-one percent
interest in General Motors. In order to assure its viability, Congress could mandate that every citizen (other than those
who could show some sort of “economic hardship” purchase a new General Motors automobile every ﬁve years, and,
again employing this “logic,” even mandate which model automobile those individuals had to buy.
Pl. Brief in Opposition to Def. Mot. to Dismiss, N.J. Phys., Inc. v. Obama, 2010 WL 4597787, at 12 (footnote omitted).
66 The Plaintiffs claim that individuals who choose not to purchase health insurance are not engaged in “commerce,” so
Congress has no power to compel them to engage in a commercial transaction. Although that position has some logical
merit, plaintiffs resort to mockery in defending their position:
A decision to do nothing does not convert nothing to something. Zero multiplied by any number still equals zero.
Under Defendants’ logic, any failure to buy – or sell – particular goods or services is both a regulable prelude to future
economic activity and a decision Congress can reach because it impacts the existing marketplace. Indeed, thought, by
itself, would be reachable under this tortured logic.
Id. at 14.
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consistent story, which is summarized in the sidebar “Individual and
Employer Stories.”
1. Protagonist

In two of the three Commerce Clause cases in this group, the ﬁrst-named
plaintiff is an institution or employer, joined by a number of private individuals;67 the third case was brought only by private individuals.68 But
even the two cases in which an institution is the lead plaintiff, the briefs
ﬁled by the parties focus heavily on the law’s alleged impact on the individual plaintiffs. Thus, the principal protagonists in these cases appear to
be individuals who prefer not to purchase health insurance. They are
generally portrayed as “rugged individuals,” distrustful of government
almost to the point of being hermits, eccentrics, or religious zealots.69
Their refusal to purchase insurance is not clearly explained in any of the
briefs;70 thus, the protagonists’ goal appears simply to be left alone.

67 In Liberty University v. Geithner, the lead plaintiff is a private Christian university founded by the Rev. Jerry Falwell Sr. In
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, the lead plaintiff describes itself as “a national, public interest law ﬁrm based in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.” Cmpl. ¶ 10, 2010 WL 4784409 (E.D. Mich. March 23, 2010). It also alleges that it provides healthcare coverage to
its employees, and therefore is subject to the provisions of the PPACA. Id. at ¶ 12. These are the only two parties in this group
of cases which claim standing as employers affected by PPACA. Both cases also include a number of individuals as
coplaintiffs.
68 Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (listing plaintiffs).
69 For example, the government, and one judge, noted that President Obama had signed an executive order conﬁrming that
no federal funding could be used to fund abortions, in conformity with the preexisting Hyde Amendment. They noted, as
well, that provisions of PPACA itself require at least one multistate health insurance plan that does not provide coverage for
abortion services except in cases of rape or incest or when the life of the woman is endangered. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1334(a)(6); Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 643. In light of the speciﬁc provisions of the law protecting
against the possible involvement of federal funds with abortion services and requiring at least one insurance plan for individuals to choose that did not cover those services (other than situations in which courts have held that a woman’s right of
access to those services may not be prohibited), plaintiffs’ objections along these lines appear somewhat unreasonable.
70 In Liberty University v. Geithner, the Plaintiffs’ brief reports that two of the individual plaintiffs
have chosen not to purchase health insurance and do not desire health insurance coverage, but instead take care of
health care costs as they arise. They are Christians who believe in living out their sincerely held religious beliefs in
everyday life, including in the lifestyle choice they make. [They] have sincerely held religious beliefs that abortions,
except where necessary to save the life of the pregnant mother, are murder and morally repugnant, that they should
play no part in facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting such abortions because to do so is evil and
morally repugnant complicity, and that they should not formally associate with those who would facilitate, subsidize,
ease, fund or support such abortions.
Pl. Brief in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, 2010 WL 4850338 at 7 (W.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2010). How PPACA might “facilitate,
subsidize, ease, fund or support” abortions is not explained.
Likewise, in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama,
Plaintiffs do not have private health care insurance. They do not intend to purchase health care coverage. And they
object to being forced to purchase health care coverage under the Act. . . . Plaintiffs have arranged their personal affairs
such that it will be a hardship for them to have to either pay for health insurance that is not necessary or desirable or
face penalties under the Act. . . . [They will have to reorganize their affairs and essentially change the way they presently
live to meet the government’s demands.
Pl. Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. & Brief in Support, 2010 WL 4784264 at 4 (E.D. Mich., April 6, 2010). And the plaintiffs’ goals are
no clearer in Mead v. Holder: “Plaintiffs are United States citizens who do not currently have health insurance and do not
want or need such insurance.” Memo. of Points and Authorities in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL 5827945 at 7 (D. D.C.,
August 10, 2010).
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At least three potential heroic archetypes might ﬁt the individual
plaintiffs in this group of cases. They could be viewed as
Seekers–Wanderers, whose archetypal task is to seek a better life through
exploration of the world.71 The chief virtue of such heroes is autonomy;
their fear is conformity.72 But Wanderers defeat their dragons by walking
away from them, not by doing battle with them;73 and the briefs ﬁled on
behalf of these plaintiffs are full of ﬁght. Thus, much like the physician
plaintiffs in the previous group, the more likely choices of heroic archetype
for the private individuals are Warrior or Outlaw. Choosing the Warrior
hero is tempting, because unlike the physicians, whose quest was simply
to retain their economic advantage in the practice of medicine, the goal of
these plaintiffs—autonomy and self-determination—seems appealing. But,
ultimately, the Outlaw archetype seems to be the more likely choice, for
the briefs are full of “righteous indignation” and claims of “radical
freedoms,” two of the hallmark virtues of Outlaw heroes,74 and the protagonists’ goals seem highly self-interested, that is, to protect their autonomy.
2. Goal

The goal of this group of plaintiffs is unambiguously identiﬁed as
protecting their right to decline to purchase health insurance. But rather
than set forth a vision of individual freedom, the briefs focus on the
obstacle: Congress’ assertion of broad powers under the Commerce
Clause. Little space is devoted to why individual freedom is important to
the protagonist. The overall impression the briefs leave with the reader is
that of stubbornness: Congress cannot force the plaintiffs to behave in
ways that pleases Congress. By simply asserting that they prefer not to
abide by the law, the plaintiffs overtly don the clothing of the Outlaw,
seeking to destroy the law they perceive as impinging on their freedom.
3. Obstacle

The private individuals and employers also seem to share the same
obstacles as the physician plaintiffs: the PPACA itself is a systemic
obstacle, while Congress is the antagonist. But not all the plaintiffs seemed
to cast Congress in the role of Villain. The plaintiffs’ brief in Mead v.
Holder75 seems a bit more focused on logical reasoning and is less
hyperbolic, suggesting that Congress is merely a Threshold Guardian.

71 See Robbins, supra n. 19, at 803; Pearson, supra n. 26, at 123–25.
72 Robbins, supra n. 19 at 803.
73 Pearson, supra n. 26, at 123.
74 See Robbins, supra n. 19, at 802.
75 See Memo. of Points and Authorities in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL 5827945.
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However, the briefs in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama and Liberty
University v. Geithner tend to demonize Congress.76 For example, Thomas
More Law Center’s brief contains this parade-of-horribles argument:
If the Act is understood to fall within Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority, the federal government will have the absolute and unfettered
power to create complex regulatory schemes to ﬁx every perceived
problem imaginable and to do so by ordering private citizens to engage
in afﬁrmative acts, under penalty of law, such as taking vitamins, losing
weight, joining health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG
insurance policy, among others. The term “Nanny State” does not even
begin to describe what we will have wrought if in fact the Health Care
Reform Act falls within any imaginable governmental authority. To be
sure, George Orwell’s 1984 will be just the primer for our new civics.77

Liberty University’s brief contains additional examples of namecalling and hyperbolic rhetoric.78
It is therefore safe to say that at least some of these plaintiffs
attempted, like the physicians, to cast Congress in the role of Villain:
purely evil.
C. The state-government story
Of the twelve cases in my study, only two were ﬁled by state governments
or their representatives.79 Both cases were resolved on the merits of the

76 See Pl. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Brief in Support, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2010 WL 4784264; Pl. Brief in
Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4850338.
I realize that this statement is highly subjective. In an effort to quantify this claim, I engaged in a little experiment,
based on the article by Professors Lance Long and William Christensen: Clearly, Using Intensifiers is Very Bad–Or Is It?, 45
Idaho L. Rev. 171 (2008). In that article, Professors Long and Christensen counted the number of times “intensiﬁers” (words
like “clearly,” “plainly,” “very,” “obviously” and the like appeared on the pages of actual briefs ﬁled in the Utah Supreme Court.
They then calculated the “intensiﬁers per page ratio” for each brief, then studied the results in those cases to see if there was
any correlation between using intensiﬁers and success (or failure) in the outcome. I borrowed their methodology and
designed a WordPerfect macro to “read” all of the briefs in these cases and count the number of times certain intensiﬁers
appeared in the briefs. I used Long and Christensen’s list of intensiﬁers, plus a few variations and additions of words that I
considered to be hyperbole, then manually checked to be sure that the words flagged by my macro were actually being used
as intensiﬁers. (For example, the word “clear” was often used as part of a legal standard, such as “clear and convincing
evidence.”) I then eliminated those words from the count, and calculated an “intensiﬁer per page” ratio for each of the briefs.
The Thomas More Center and Liberty University briefs rang up 1.25 and 1.22, respectively, intensiﬁers per page, while the
Mead v. Holder brief scored only 0.65 intensiﬁers per page. The United States briefs in those three cases scored, respectively,
0.18, 0.73, and 0.45 intensiﬁers per page.
77 Pl. Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. & Brief in Support, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2010 WL 4784264 at 12.
78 For example, the plaintiffs’ brief argues that the government’s position
deﬁes common sense. More importantly, it does not create the necessary nexus between an individual’s economic
activity and interstate commerce. This socialist mentality would allow Congress to nationalize anything on the
assumption that all must pay in order to make the object of regulation affordable to all.
Pl. Brief in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4850338 at 16.
79 It may be a bit misleading to characterize these cases as having been ﬁled on behalf of state governments, of course, since
it is often difﬁcult to decide who speaks on behalf of the state. All of the “states” that signed on to one of the two cases in this
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Commerce Clause issue, rather than
standing.80 They are summarized in the sidebar
“State Government Stories.” The main case in
this group is Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept.
of Health and Human Services, a case ultimately joined by twenty-six state Attorneys
General.81 A second case, Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, was brought solely on
behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia by its
Attorney General.82 Both cases tell similar
stories on behalf of the plaintiffs.

State Government Stories
Protagonist(s) State governments.
Hero type: Ruler.
Goal(s) Not to increase spending
on health care; protect state police
power from federal usurpation
Obstacle(s) (1) Systemic (Act
coerces states to behave in ways
acceptable to the federal
government); (2) Antagonist
(Congress as Threshold Guardian)

1. Protagonist

The selection of a heroic archetype for the State plaintiffs is fairly straightforward: they take on the role of Ruler heroes. The goal of a Ruler is to
“create a prosperous family or community, and to gain power.”83 The chief
task of a Ruler hero is to take responsibility, for himself or herself or for
others.84 The briefs in both cases are clearly about preserving state power,
allegedly to protect the members of their community (state citizens) from
the overreaching federal government. The states claim the responsibility
for insuring the welfare of the citizens within their borders.
2. Goal

Both of the cases in this group tell essentially a “states’ rights” story. Both
briefs invoke the Framers and the original intent of the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.85 Both briefs argue that the PPACA, if it
were allowed to coerce citizens to purchase insurance, would create an
almost unlimited federal police power, correspondingly decreasing the
power historically considered to be exclusively exercised by states. The

group were added to the litigation on the authority of the
elected Republican state attorney general, even though in
some cases the state governor and one or more of the
houses of the state legislature were controlled by
Democrats, who may not have agreed with joining their
state as a plaintiff in this litigation.
80 The United States raised the standing issue in both cases,
but lost: Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2011);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598,
607 (E.D. Va. 2010).
81 See 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1262–63 (listing plaintiffs). Two
individual plaintiffs and an association representing
business interests also joined as plaintiffs, although the brief
on behalf of the Plaintiffs barely mentions them at all; they
appear to be “fail safe” plaintiffs designed to insure that
some plaintiff had standing to bring the lawsuit.

82 See 728 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
83 Robbins, supra n. 19, at 803.
84 Pearson, supra n. 26, at 183.
85 The brief in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services makes a passing reference to the
original intent: “If this had been the Framers’ intent, and if
this is the Constitution’s meaning, then all of the remaining
provisions of Article I, section 8 demarcating Congress’s
speciﬁc authority would be ‘mere surplusage.’” Memo. in
Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL 4564355 at 15 The
brief in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius is much more
expansive, including an entire section devoted to the
historical context in which the Commerce Clause was
drafted, including a citation to the Federalist Papers. Pl.
Memo. in Support of Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL 3536788 at
10–11 (E.D. Va., Sept. 3, 2010).
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Commonwealth of Virginia’s brief (at least as far as it relates to the
Commerce Clause issue) is exclusively devoted to a discussion of the
boundary between the power of the states and the power of the federal
government; its statement of the undisputed facts also points out that the
Virginia legislature enacted, and its governor signed, a law providing that
no citizen of the Commonwealth could be compelled to purchase health
insurance except in speciﬁed, and limited, circumstances.86 The Plaintiffs’
brief in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services is
similarly protective of states’ right to decide what is best for their
citizens;87 it also includes a section claiming that the PPACA would force
states to incur “substantial costs and obligations to cover millions more
Americans through a fundamentally transformed Medicaid program.”88
Thus, the goal of the state plaintiffs is simply preservation of their
rights as Rulers against the competing claim of a different Ruler (the
federal government).
3. Obstacle

The obstacles in this story are similar to those in the stories told by the
physicians and the private individuals. The principal obstacle is systemic:
the PPACA itself. But Congress also appears fairly clearly in the role of
antagonist as well. These briefs are not immune from the occasional
hyperbolic claim,89 but they do not sound as histrionic as some of the
briefs ﬁled by the private plaintiffs.90 And because the Florida brief, in
particular, acknowledges a legitimate role for Congress in health-care
funding,91 it appears that the States have taken a more nuanced, and
reasonable, view of Congress as antagonist. Rather than characterize
Congress as a pure Villain, the states appear to cast Congress as a

86 Pl.’s Memo. in Support of Mot. for S.J., Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli, 2010 WL 3536788 at 7–8. The circumstances
under which a person could be compelled to purchase
health insurance primarily involve court or administrative
proceedings, or situations in which college students are
required to obtain and maintain health insurance as a
condition of enrollment. Id. at 7.
87 In pointing out that Congress explicitly invoked the
example of the healthcare law adopted in Massachusetts,
which also includes an individual mandate, plaintiffs note
wryly that
Congress’s open emulation of a State police-power
regulation is telling. In enacting the Individual
Mandate, Congress is attempting to exercise the very
plenary power that the Constitution forbids it.
Memo. in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL 4564355 at
16.
88 Id. at 20.

89 For example, the brief in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services claims that the
Commerce Clause power that Congress claims in enacting
PPACA is “unbridled,” “novel and sweeping;” and that the
new Medicaid regime would cause “devastating consequences to [states’] already-strained budgets.” Id. at 8. It
further described the new, broader federal program as
imposing “crushing new costs” on the states. Id. at 21.
90 The “intensiﬁer ratio” for the Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius brief was 0.78, and for the Florida ex rel. Bondi v.
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services it was 1.17. Both of
these scores were still higher than the corresponding briefs
on behalf of the United States: 0.29 and 0.28, respectively.
91 See Memo. in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., 2010 WL
4564355 at 20 (emphasis in original) (“Medicaid was the
hallmark of cooperative federalism, a true partnership, when
the States joined the program in the 1960’s and 1970’s.” Id.).
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Threshold Guardian: not purely evil, but simply a character whose
objective was different from that of the protagonist.

D. The United States government story
Whereas the stories told by the plaintiffs
varied among these three groups of
plaintiffs—because there were different
protagonists in each story—the United
States told essentially the same story in
all cases, which is summarized in the
sidebar “United States Government
Story.”
1. Protagonist

United States Government Story
Protagonist(s) (1) The United States
government, acting benignly on behalf of all
citizens. Hero type: Ruler.; (2) All American
citizens. Hero type: Everyperson
Goal(s) Affordable health care for all
citizens
Obstacle(s) (1) Systemic (health care
system); (2) Antagonists (various Threshold
Guardians, including private insurers who
cherry-pick the healthiest patients and freeloaders who don’t buy insurance and then
rely on charity care from health care
providers, who then pass the cost of that
care back to Everyperson)

The United States tells a more complex
story than any of the plaintiffs do. It
cannot deny its basic persona as a Ruler
hero: it is attempting to create a prosperous community for all citizens by
creating a new system that provides affordable healthcare for all. But, no
doubt mindful of the plaintiffs’ attempt to paint the federal government as
a big, bad bully, the attorneys for the United States also cast all American
citizens in the role of coprotagonist, or at least a companion character.
After all, a Ruler’s job is to protect his family or community; thus, all of the
briefs ﬁled by the United States do a good job of putting the people it
protects (the Everyperson hero, all American citizens) into the center of
the story. In this regard, the United States’ briefs are more nuanced than
those ﬁled by the other contestants for the mantle of Ruler, the state
governments. The states’ briefs make infrequent references to their own
citizens and seem to characterize this dispute as a more personal ﬁght
between the United States and the state governments themselves.
2. Goal

The United States has also chosen a goal that nobody can reasonably
argue with. There is little dispute that healthcare in this country is
allocated in ways that favor the wealthy and that leave many people of
modest means with inadequate or no health insurance. Fair-minded
people would likely wish that healthcare be more universally available,
and at a lower cost. Although this is a worthy goal for a benign Ruler, given
the ascendancy of antigovernment sentiment among a segment of the
population, it is not surprising that the government chose to downplay its
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own role in securing that goal, and to put its companion character,
Everyperson, at the center of its story.
3. Obstacle

The United States also does a good job of depersonalizing the obstacle it is
trying to overcome. Most of the briefs ﬁled by the United States begin by
depicting a health-care system that is badly broken, in which insurance
companies pick and choose who they will cover, and which leaves 45
million Americans without basic health insurance.92 It describes this
situation as unfair because “virtually no individuals can make a personal
choice to eliminate all current or potential future consumption of
healthcare services.”93 But it points out that, because federal Medicare law
requires hospitals with emergency rooms to treat and stabilize every
patient who presents, regardless of his or her ability to pay, uninsured
people don’t go without healthcare. They simply get free (or “charity”)
care at the nearest hospital emergency room.94 The hospital then recovers
the cost of that care by a practice known as “cost shifting,” in which it overcharges insured or self-pay patients in order to generate funds to provide
free care to uninsured patients.95
In this story, all citizens are depicted as protagonists, deserving of
reasonably priced and universally available healthcare. The antagonists
include the greedy96 insurance companies who seek to “exclude from
coverage those they deem most likely to incur expenses.”97 The solution to
the problem, according to this story, is to require insurance companies to
cover everybody, without imposing an exclusion for preexisting
conditions, and to require everybody to share the cost. Thus the so-called
“individual mandate,” which requires everybody to purchase insurance (on
pain of a tax penalty if they do not), creates the largest possible risk pool

92 Despite the fact that insurance companies have potentially the most at stake in healthcare reform, none of the cases in the
study group were brought by insurance companies. Perhaps because, as some commentators have noted, the bill that actually
passed may beneﬁt insurance companies in the long run, by increasing the number of people who purchase insurance. See
Ken Terry, CBS Money Watch, Big Winner in Healthcare Reform? Insurance Companies, Eventually (March 22, 2010)
(available at http://www.bnet.com/blog/healthcare-business/big-winner-in-healthcare-reform-insurance-companies-eventually/1267).
93 Memo. in Support of Def. Mot. for S.J., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2010 WL
4564357 at 12 (N.D. Fla., Nov. 4, 2010). Not all of the many briefs ﬁled by the United States contain extensive recitations of
the facts, since apparently some of the trial courts requested the parties submit a joint statement of the record. The brief that
probably contains the most complete recitation of the facts of the case from the United States’ point of view is its brief in the
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services case; thus, the representative examples I draw upon in this
section of the article are all from that brief.
94 Id. at 12.
95 Id. at 14.
96 My word, not the United States’.
97 Id. at 13.
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over which to spread the risk of health-related expenses. By not allowing
people to wait until they actually need healthcare to purchase insurance,
premiums for everybody will be lower because more people are sharing
the costs.
By telling this complex story, the United States appears to be facing
reality. The story rings true.98 There is no effort to demonize insurance
companies: while the briefs generally include a section describing
insurance industry practices such as “cherry-pick[ing]” healthy patients
while denying coverage to those who are not as healthy, and denying
coverage for pre-existing conditions,99 they do so by reciting facts in a
fairly neutral manner.100 There is an implicit understanding that insurance
companies are for-proﬁt enterprises, simply participating in the free
market, as is their legal right. Indeed, the tone of the government briefs is,
on the whole, much more subdued than that of any of the plaintiffs.101
Accordingly, it appears that the government has cast the antagonists in its
story as Threshold Guardians: simply characters with understandable (and
legal) objectives that are at odds with the government’s more important
objectives (the protection of Everyperson).

IV. The Winners and the Losers
Whereas these twelve cases raised a variety of legal issues, the only two
issues that resulted in ﬁnal dispositions of any of the cases were whether
the plaintiffs had standing to sue and whether PPACA is a valid exercise of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Might the stories allied
with the parties’ archetypal roles have influenced the court’s decision in
each of those cases?
A. The standing cases
Six of the twelve cases in this study were resolved on the issue whether the
plaintiffs had standing to sue.102 Five of the plaintiffs in that group were
private individuals or employers; one was a group of physicians. None of

98 It thus satisﬁes the reader’s desire for what Prof. Rideout describes as “narrative ﬁdelity.” See generally Rideout, supra n. 10.
99 See e.g. Memo. in Support of Def. Mot. for S.J., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2010 WL
4564357 at 13.
100 For example, the brief cites statistics compiled by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Ofﬁce regarding the number of
uninsured Americans, various scholarly articles regarding consumer behavior, and testimony before Congress from various
scholars. Id. at 12–13.
101 The average “intensiﬁer ratio” for all of the United States briefs in the Commerce Clause cases was 0.36; the average ratio
for all of the Plaintiffs’ principal briefs in those same cases was 1.02, or nearly three times higher.
102 See supra Table 1.
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the cases brought by state governments was dismissed at the trial level for
lack of standing.103
1. Physicians vs. United States

The physicians lost. Their story—“we like our business model the way it
is”—apparently did not resonate with Judge Wigenton in quite the way
that the “we’re all in this together” story of the United States did. Their
story was essentially that the physicians were comfortable with the
existing business model for practicing medicine and did not want anything
to change.104 This case was dismissed by the trial judge on the basis that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.105
It is not hard to imagine why the government’s story of “we’re all in
this together” was more effective. In a contest between well-educated and
highly-paid physicians and the American Everyperson—who is lucky if he
has health insurance at all, much less adequate coverage—Everyperson is
going to be the more sympathetic protagonist. Moreover, since the
physicians did a poor job of explaining what potential negative impact the
law would have on them (i.e. they didn’t tell a very good story), it is not
surprising that the court found plaintiffs did not have a “concrete and
particularized” injury, i.e., one “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical,”106 sufﬁcient to maintain standing. In fact, the court
suggested openly that it simply didn’t believe the physicians’ story:
Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Criscito has standing because the Act will affect
“the manner in which he may, or may not seek payment for his professional services and the manner in which he may render treatment to his
patients.” According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Criscito will be unable to accept
direct payments from his patients once the Act is effective. However, this
argument has no basis. The Act does not prohibit Dr. Criscito or any
physician from accepting direct payments from their patients. . . .
Additionally, the Act does not specify how physicians should render
treatment to their patients.107

Thus, one can reasonably attribute the plaintiffs’ failure in this case to
their failure to tell a good enough story: the protagonist was less
appealing, the goal was not sufﬁciently worthy, and the obstacle was not
real.

103 However, one of the state cases was reversed on appeal
and dismissed on the basis that the Commonwealth of
Virginia lacked standing to sue. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 656 F.3d at 272–73.
104 See supra Table IV.

105 The trial court’s ruling was afﬁrmed on appeal. N. J.
Phys., Inc. v. Obama, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011).
106 See N. J. Phys., Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
107 Id. at 510 (internal citations omitted).

LegalComm_Rhetoric_2012_v09tp_interior 7/17/12 5:04 PM Page 122

122

LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 9 / 2012

2. Individuals and employers vs. United States

The ﬁve private individual–employer cases had mixed results.108 In three
cases, the courts granted the motion by the United States to dismiss the
case due to lack of standing,109 while in two cases the motion was
denied.110 Yet the United States also raised the standing issue in the four
private-plaintiff cases (as well as the two state-plaintiff cases), in which the
court did reach the Commerce Clause issue. The courts necessarily found
standing in all four of those cases—else they could not have decided the
Commerce Clause issue.111 Thus, the ﬁnal “scorecard” for the standing
issue, when litigated in the context of private individuals or employers,
was six private-plaintiff cases ﬁnding standing, and three not.
Why this occurred is difﬁcult to puzzle out. Though the mainstream
media has focused on the political afﬁliation of the judges deciding the
cases on the Commerce Clause issue, suggesting political motivation,112
this explanation does not account for the cases decided on the standing
issue. Of those six cases, plaintiffs were found to lack standing in four, and
to have standing in two.113 Three of the four judges who dismissed the
cases due to lack of standing were appointed by Republican Presidents,
which does not ﬁt the political explanation for how these cases were
decided. In addition, one of the judges who found standing in this group of
six was appointed by a Democratic President. Thus, four of the cases
resolved on the standing issue do not seem to ﬁt the supposed political
“pattern.”
Moreover, three judges appointed by Democratic Presidents reached
the Commerce Clause issue, necessarily ﬁnding that the plaintiffs had
standing (again running counter to the political explanation). Together
with the four judges who ruled on the standing issue, in seven of the
twelve cases studied, the rulings on standing seem contraindicated by the
metric of which party’s President appointed the judge.114

108 See supra Table I.

113 See supra Table 1.

109 Baldwin v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 3418436 at 5; Shreve v.
Obama, 2010 WL 4628177 at 7; Butler v. Obama, 814 F.
Supp. 2d at 242.

114 Although my study was limited to the trial court opinions, in the one standing case that has been decided to date
on appeal, this political bias explanation did not work,
either. In N. J. Phys., Inc. v. Obama, a unanimous three-judge
panel afﬁrmed the dismissal of the case for lack of standing.
653 F.3d at 241. Two of the judges on that panel (Chagares
and Jordan) were appointed by Pres. George H.W. Bush,
which of course would be contraindicated if party politics
had really made a difference. This is not to suggest, however,
that the political afﬁliation of the President who appoints a
judge is a reliable proxy for the political inclinations of the
appointee; I make this observation merely to debunk the
metric that most mainstream media commentators have
used.

110 U.S. Citizens Assoc. v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 910;
Bryant v. Holder, 2011 WL 710693 at 13.
111 See Thomas More Ctr v. Obama; Mead v. Holder; GoudyBachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services.
112 I.e., the cases the United States won were decided by
judges appointed by a Democratic president, whereas the
cases won by the plaintiffs were decided by judges appointed
by a Republican president. See supra Table 1; see also Kevin
Sack, Round 1 in Appeals of Health Care Overhaul Goes to
Obama, N.Y. Times, A15 (June 20, 2011) (“In various cases
at the lower District Court level, ﬁve judges have divided on
the question, with three Democratic appointees backing the
law and two Republican appointees rejecting it.”)

115 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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A better explanation for the results in the standing cases is probably
that they are simply much more fact-bound than the cases decided on the
merits of the Commerce Clause issue. A particular plaintiff has standing to
sue only when he has “suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”115 Since this standard
requires a close examination of the facts peculiar to each plaintiff, it is
hard to compare standing cases to each other.116
B. The Commerce Clause cases
The results in the six cases decided on the merits of the Commerce Clause
issue were much more consistent. All of the state attorneys general won,
and all but one117 of the private plaintiffs lost. But these results seem
completely counterintuitive: since all of the cases challenged something
called the “individual mandate,” wouldn’t the individuals have a more
compelling story to tell as to how they have been injured?
What happened here? The Commerce Clause issue is a pure question
of law. All the parties had the same case law and the same arguments
available to them, and they all basically cited the same cases and made the
same arguments. One signiﬁcant variable in the Commerce Clause cases is
the narrative argument.
There are certainly multiple possible reasons why these cases came
out differently. These cases do break down neatly along political lines: the
three judges appointed by Democratic presidents found the law constitutional, while the two judges appointed by Republican presidents found the
law unconstitutional.118 But given that the standing issue did not break

116 The standing issue did not break nicely according to the type of plaintiff. Of the six cases shown in Table 1, supra, that
were decided on the standing issue, ﬁve were ﬁled by private individuals or companies (the lone exception being N. J. Phys.
Assoc. v. Obama). In three of those cases, the private plaintiffs were found to lack standing, while in the other two standing
was found. This reinforces the conclusion that these decisions were more likely based on the individual facts presented by
each of the different plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs.
117 The exception was Goudy-Bachman v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, which was decided after several of the
Courts of Appeals had issued their rulings in other cases. See supra Table 1. A possible explanation for this outlier case is
discussed in note 145, infra.
118 See supra n. 115 and accompanying text. Yet this pattern has broken down in all of the Courts of Appeals decisions that
reached the merits of the Commerce Clause issue. In Thomas More Law Ctr v. Obama the panel afﬁrmed by a 2–1 vote the
trial court’s decision that the PPACA was constitutional. 651 F.3d at 549. One of the judges in the majority (Sutton) was
appointed by Pres. George H.W. Bush. In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, the panel afﬁrmed
by a 2–1 vote the trial court decision that the law was unconstitutional. 648 F.3d at 1282–320. One of the judges in the
majority (Hull) was appointed by Pres. Clinton. In the third case, Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 15–20 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the
panel afﬁrmed by a 2–1 vote the trial court’s decision that the law was constitutional. One of the judges in that majority
(Silverman) was appointed by President Reagan; in addition, Judge Kavanagh (appointed by President George H.W. Bush)
would have declined to reach the merits and dismissed the case because he believed the suit contravened the Anti-Injunction
Act. Id. at 21.
The Fourth Circuit did not reach the Commerce Clause issue in either of the cases it decided on appeal. In Virginia ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, the court unanimously vacated the trial court’s holding that the PPACA contravened the Commerce
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along political lines,119 and also because the judges themselves most likely
would deny that politics had anything to do with their decisions, it is
useful to consider other possible explanations. One such possibility is that
the different stories told by the parties affected the judges in different
ways. Since the defendant told essentially the same story in all of the cases
and the plaintiffs told different stories (depending on who the client was),
the differences in the stories may explain why some plaintiffs succeeded
and why others did not.
1. The private individuals’ stories

All but one of the private individuals and employers eventually lost. Of the
eight cases, three were dismissed for lack of standing120 and three others
were dismissed on summary judgment when the trial judges concluded
that the statute was constitutional.121 In one case, the trial court ultimately
ruled that the PPACA violated the Commerce Clause.122
In the seventh case, in which the trial court concluded that the
PPACA violated the Commerce Clause, the private individuals presented
themselves as Outlaw heroes, railing against the villainous Congress.123
Theirs was a story of rugged individualism. The protagonists all wanted to
be left alone, free from government interference. They were self-reliant
individuals who would choose their own method for paying for any
healthcare they might need, thank you very much.
Although the United States presented itself as a Ruler hero, the focus
of the brief was not on its power to protect. Instead, the brief focused on
the needs of the government’s companion, the American citizens
(portrayed as an Everyperson hero). The Everyperson story actually works
quite well to counteract the “Rugged Individual” story. In the government’s
story, everybody (including the Rugged Individuals) will need healthcare
at some point. The larger the pool of people working together to carry that
burden, the lighter the burden will be on everybody. By opting out of that
pool, the Rugged Individuals are forcing Everyperson to carry more of the
burden, all the while leaving the Rugged Individuals with the option of

Clause and instead ruled that the Commonwealth of Virginia lacked standing to sue. 656 F.3d at 273. In Liberty University v.
Geithner, the same panel vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Act was constitutional and instead ruled 2–1 that the suit
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 671 F.3d at 401–15. Judge Davis dissented from that holding, but would have ruled the
PPACA to be constitutional. 671 F.3d at 422–52. All three judges on that panel were appointed by Democratic Presidents.
119 See supra sec. IV.A.2.
120 See supra Table 1.
121 Id.
122 See id. In the eighth case, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, thereby retaining jurisdiction of the
matter, but no ﬁnal disposition has yet occurred.
123 See supra sidebar Individual and Employers’ Story.
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jumping into the insurance market at the moment they need care (since
the law prohibits insurance companies from denying coverage for preexisting conditions). This combination of the initial refusal to share the
burden common to Everyperson and the ability to reap the beneﬁts of the
law effectively portrays the Rugged Individuals as freeloaders. So the
Outlaw story becomes unappealing: the goal of the Rugged Individuals is
not worthy (or at least less worthy than the goal of the Ruler and
Everyperson: affordable healthcare for all). The Rugged Individuals turn
out to be part of the problem that the government describes.
Yet the government portrays the Rugged Individuals not as villains,
but merely as threshold guardians. The briefs do not claim there is
anything evil or immoral about the Plaintiffs’ goal; it is simply in conflict
with the more important goal shared by so many more people. Thus, the
government’s story seems to ﬁt reality: it is plausible and nuanced. The
protagonists and antagonists behave in ways that appear to be normal and
easily understood. And the outcome has a certain Mr. Spock–like logic to
it: the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.124
2. State Governments vs. the United States

The United States prevailed in all of the lawsuits brought by private individuals. The only two cases that resulted in victories for the plaintiffs were
the two cases ﬁled by state governments. When all of the private lawsuits
were unsuccessful, why were both of the state government cases
successful? Was the fundamentally different story told by the state
governments at least part of the reason?
The states told an appealing story of federalism and states’ rights. In
our constitutional form of government, the central government is
supposed to be a government of limited power. The Constitution itself
enumerates certain powers available to the federal government, but
speciﬁcally provides that powers not delegated to the United States are
retained by the States, or the people.125 One consequence of this scheme is
that, whereas the states retain a general “police power” to protect the
health and safety of their citizens, the federal government does not have
such a broad power. This system likely results from the Founders’ then-

124 In the movie Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, Mr. Spock sacriﬁces his life to effect a repair to the Starship Enterprise. In
his dying moments after making the repair, the following exchange takes place between Spock and the ship’s commander:
Spock: Don’t grieve, Admiral. It is logical. The needs of the many outweigh . . .
Kirk: . . . the needs of the few. . .
Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (Paramount Pictures 1982) (dialogue available at http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0084726/quotes).
125 U.S. Const. amend X.
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recent (and unpleasant) experiences with strong central governments far
from the people.126
In these cases, then, the Everyperson story told by the United States
actually plays into the hands of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff–states told a
story in which a strong central government is something to be feared; then
along came the United States to conﬁrm the states’ worst fears by saying,
“We are here to represent everybody in the country.” The federal
government’s story perfectly ﬁts the image of the strong central power that
the Founders fought a revolution to overthrow. The plaintiffs’ goal of
preserving the police power of the states is portrayed as worthy, and the
federal government is successfully cast as the obstacle: a Threshold
Guardian whose understandable goal nevertheless conflicts with the
higher goal of protecting state autonomy.

V. What Does It All Mean?
So, what conclusions can be drawn about which strategies worked, and,
more importantly, why those strategies worked?
A. Story can provide both motivating and justifying arguments
It is tempting to think of story as providing only a type of a norm-based
motivating argument—as opposed to a rule-based, justifying argument.127
Depending on the rule, though, a story can also function to satisfy a test
imposed by that rule. In that sense, story becomes part of the justifying
argument. For example, a rule that requires a close examination of the
facts of the case (for example, to determine whether speciﬁed factors are
present or not, or how those factors should be weighed) may require the
advocate to tell a compelling story. The standing issue in this case is a
good example of that situation.
B. If the issue is fact-sensitive, it is essential
to tell a credible story
If your path to success depends on having good facts, good storytelling is
essential. The corollary, of course, is that you’ll be penalized for bad storytelling.

126 Although this theme is not quite explicit in the briefs ﬁled by the states, it is fairly inferred from the several (and
sometimes extensive) references to the Founding Fathers, the history of the Commerce Clause, and the citations to the
Federalist Papers. This almost subliminal reference to the Revolution is far more effective than the private plaintiffs’ overt
casting as Outlaws, probably because it works at such an unconscious level.
127 See supra nn. 11–13 and accompanying text.
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The standing issue in these cases is an example of an issue that is factsensitive: whether any plaintiff has suffered a sufﬁciently concrete and
particularized injury that is actual or imminent obviously depends on the
facts. Many of the plaintiffs in this group of cases told plausible stories and
won; those who did not, lost. The best example of a bad story was the
claim by the New Jersey Physicians Association that the PPACA would
prevent physicians from billing patients directly. The judge saw no
evidence of that requirement in the PPACA, and in all likelihood this was
the key flaw in the plaintiff ’s case.128
Interestingly, the one appellate court decision that reversed the trial
court decision did so on the question of standing. In Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth of
Virginia had standing to bring suit and that the PPACA was unconstitutional.129 Part of the court’s rationale was that the Virginia legislature, like
several other states,130 had enacted a version of the Health Care Freedom
Act, which purported to exempt all citizens within the Commonwealth
from having to purchase health insurance. The trial court reasoned that
this Act, signed by the Virginia governor the day after President Obama
signed the PPACA, created a case or controversy between the state and
the federal government as to whose law should apply.131 The Fourth
Circuit, however, reversed, holding that the Commonwealth of Virginia is
not subject to the individual mandate that it challenged in the lawsuit.
Rather, the Commonwealth was seeking to assert claims held by its
citizens as parens patriae and therefore lacked sufﬁcient interest in the
case to have standing.132
At ﬁrst blush, this result may be somewhat difﬁcult to reconcile with
the United States’ successful effort to put the Everyperson story about the
need for equitable allocation of health-care resources at the center of its
argument. Why should the United States be permitted to argue on behalf
of Everyperson when the Commonwealth of Virginia could not? Most
likely, this is a case of logos trumping the story: the Supremacy Clause of

128 See supra nn. 110–11 and accompanying text. The trial court thus concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing. Of
course, another explanation for the result in this case was the lack of a sound legal argument, since the court found that the
law did not require what the plaintiffs claimed it did. That is not so much a failure of the story as it is a failure of the logos
based argument.
129 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602–07 (E.D. Va. 2010) (determining standing to sue);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 772–78 (determining constitutionality).
130 One advocacy group has reported that, as of the time this article was written, twelve states had enacted either statutes or
amendments to the state Constitution that purported to guarantee to the state’s citizens the right to refuse to purchase
healthcare insurance. See American Legislative Exchange Council, Health Care Freedom Initiative (available at
http://www.alec.org/initiatives/health-care-freedom-initiative).
131 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605–06.
132 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d at 269.
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the United States Constitution bars attempts by state governments to
nullify federal laws.133 Not even a good story can overcome settled law.
C. If the issue is law-sensitive, storytelling still matters
This conclusion is a bit counterintuitive. If the issue is one of pure law,
wouldn’t logic-based reasoning be all that is required? And wouldn’t a
judge, trained to resist emotional appeals and faithfully pledged to decide
impartially upon an evenhanded application of neutral principles of law,
distrust a story’s inherent appeal to pathos?
If rule-based reasoning were all that mattered, however, all ﬁve of the
Commerce Clause cases would likely have been resolved in the same
manner. All ﬁve judges analyzed the same cases, and the arguments made
by the parties on this issue were similar. One could therefore argue that
some of the ﬁve judges just got it “wrong” while the others got it “right.”
However, lacking any reliable metric for evaluating a judge’s competence,
assume that all ﬁve judges are equally competent to read and understand
the controlling case law. A more satisfying answer would be that this case
falls within what Judge Richard Posner calls the “open area” of cases: that
category of cases for which a legalistic examination of the applicable rules
of law does not yield a “tolerable” answer.134 That issue is purely one of
law: the same Commerce Clause applies in all ﬁve cases, and all ﬁve cases
were brought against the same defendant (ultimately, the United States
government). What is different in the ﬁve cases is the story told by the two
different groups of plaintiffs in these cases. Here, the stories told by the
parties serve as a motivating argument to supplement the justifying
argument based on the Commerce Clause. The private plaintiffs’ story was
effectively countered by the story told by the United States government;
the states’ story was not.
Of course, the different stories were not the only way in which these
cases differed. The private plaintiffs tended to be more strident in their
rhetoric and more aggressive in attempting to portray the defendants
(principally Congress) as villains. But portraying the protagonists’ obstacle
as a villain instead of some lesser antagonist is a storytelling choice. Judges
are reasonable persons and are trained to be highly skeptical readers.
Choosing an unrealistic, villainous role for the defendant–antagonist is

133 See id. at 270.
134 See Richard Posner, How Judges Think 9 (Harvard U. Press 2008). Most of the rest of Judge Posner’s book reflects his
attempt to describe how judges navigate the “open area.” Some of the tools that may help a judge decide a case in this “open
area” include “emotion, personality, policy intuitions, ideology, politics, background, and experience.” Id. at 11. It is within
Posner’s “open area,” I submit, that narrative reasoning has something valuable to offer the judicial process, since narrative
can appeal to all of the tools that Posner thinks are used to decide such cases.
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likely to raise a great deal of skepticism and therefore is probably not an
advocate’s best choice.
D. Ethos matters, too
All the plaintiffs argued that the rationale advanced by the United States in
support of PPACA would create a virtually unlimited federal power to
regulate anything it wanted to.135 When that argument was advanced by
private plaintiffs, it was rejected; when advanced by state governments, it
was successful.
It is certainly possible that this was a mere coincidence. However, it is
equally possible, or perhaps more likely, that ethos played a role in these
differing outcomes. The “unlimited federal power” argument is ultimately
a states’ rights argument: only the states have a general police power. Such
an argument would likely be taken more seriously when advanced by state
governments, since the states are protecting their own interests. The
private actors could be viewed as simply seizing opportunistically on any
argument they can think of to avoid a result they don’t like. In short, the
states have the credibility (ethos) to make the argument; the private actors,
not so much.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius
is further evidence that ethos matters.136 In that case, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision that the Commonwealth of Virginia had
standing to sue on behalf of its citizens for an alleged injury (the individual
mandate) that the citizens alone (and not the state) suffered. This presents
the converse of the Commerce Clause decisions: only individuals could
credibly challenge the individual mandate.
E. The law and the story must fit together seamlessly
Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from these cases is that the
story must ﬁt the legal theory.
Persuasion is like a double helix: one strand of logos wound tightly
with a strand of narrative reasoning.137 But for this technique to create a
viable “DNA” molecule, the two strands must complement each other in a
natural way. If they don’t ﬁt together well, the persuasion won’t work.

135 See Pl. Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. & Brief in Support, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 2010 WL 4784264 at 12; Memo.
of Points and Authorities in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., Mead v. Holder, 2010 WL 5827945 at 11–18; Pl. Brief in Opposition
to Mot. to Dismiss, Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4850338 at 16-17; Pl. Memo. in Support of Mot. for S.J., Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 3536788 at 13–14; Memo. in Support of Pl. Mot. for S.J., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2010 WL 4564355, passim.
136 See discussion at n. 129–32, above.
137 See Chestek, Judging By the Numbers, supra n. 5, at 3–5.
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The briefs of the private plaintiffs illustrate this point well. The basic
story (the narrative strand of reasoning) was simply this: We want to be
left alone and don’t want the government telling us what to do. The logos
strand consisted of an argument that the Commerce Clause did not give
Congress the power to compel individuals to purchase insurance. But that
logos does not ﬁt the story, since it does not prove that “government” can’t
compel individuals to purchase insurance. It proves only that the federal
government cannot do so. The plaintiffs’ legal theory leaves state
governments free to compel individuals to purchase insurance,138 so the
plaintiffs cannot achieve through this theory what their story suggests
they really want.
The state governments’ more limited claim, however, does ﬁt the legal
theory perfectly. Their story is that they want to protect their own prerogatives in caring for their own citizens.139 The Commerce Clause argument
matches that goal. Little wonder, then, that the states won and the private
individuals did not.
F. The story must sound true
One of the deﬁning features of the stories told by the parties was their
complexity. All the plaintiffs (both private and states) told fairly simple
stories: the plaintiffs were pure and worthy protagonists, the defendants
were evil antagonists (portrayed as Villains). The United States, however,
told a much more nuanced and complex story. For example, the story of
the United States included more characters, including the government’s
Everyperson companion protagonist (all American citizens) and a
multitude of antagonists (insurance companies, health-care providers,
freeloaders), all drawn as Threshold Guardians. The complex interrelationships among all these characters were fully explained. The goals of the
protagonists were much more clearly and explicitly laid out than the goals
of any of the plaintiffs in their own briefs.
Perhaps because the audience for these briefs was a judge (as opposed
to a jury), this complexity seems to have paid off for the United States, at
least in the private-plaintiff lawsuits. This may be because the judges
understood that we live in a complex world and that they trusted the
United States’ briefs to be more-accurate portrayals of the problem of
inequitable distribution of health-care services and the potential solution.

138 The state of Massachusetts does this for healthcare, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111M (Supp. 2012), and every state
does it for automobile insurance, see Lee R. Russ et al., Couch on Insurance vol. 7A, § 109:1 (3d ed., Thomson/West 2005).
139 There is a certain irony that the states’ method of “protecting its citizens” in the healthcare arena is to do nothing themselves, but simply to allow the private market to do whatever its invisible hands feel is appropriate. The states’ argument boils
down to “protecting their citizens” by leaving them at the mercy of private actors.
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Professor Chris Rideout describes what he calls three features (or
“properties”) of narratives that can be psychologically persuasive: narrative
coherence, narrative correspondence, and narrative ﬁdelity.140 He
describes “narrative ﬁdelity” as the audience’s perception of whether the
story “ring[s] true with the stories [the audience] know[s] to be true.”141
Stated another way, narrative ﬁdelity requires the audience to evaluate
whether the stories they hear “represent[] accurate assertions about social
reality and thereby constitutes good reasons for belief or action.”142
Because the story told by the United States about the complex healthcare-ﬁnance system was well-supported with factual authority and likely
corresponded with judges’ preexisting knowledge of how the health-care
system works, it likely “rang true” to the audience’s ears and thus reflected
good “narrative ﬁdelity.”
But why did that work only in the case of the private plaintiffs? The
United States told the same complex story in the two cases ﬁled by state
governments, but lost those two cases. The United States’ loss may have
been because the states were able to make the story be about something
other than health-care ﬁnance.
The private plaintiffs played on the same ﬁeld as the United States: the
case was about health-care ﬁnance, and the story told by the United States
had more narrative ﬁdelity. The states, however, played on a different ﬁeld:
that of federalism. Their story was about power; speciﬁcally, in our federal
system, which sovereign is permitted to make decisions about the welfare
of its citizens? The case really wasn’t about healthcare at all; it was just a
power struggle, and they (the weaker states) needed the court’s intervention to protect them from a much stronger adversary, the overreaching
United States government. That story apparently had more “narrative
ﬁdelity” for the judges who heard those cases than the health-care ﬁnance
story told by the United States.
G. Audience matters, too
Which recalls the initial question suggested by the media: Isn’t it all about
the political leanings of the judges who heard these cases?
In the cases brought by the states, the trial judges had competing
narratives to choose from.143 The United States told a story about a
dysfunctional health-care system, while the states told a story about a

140 Rideout, supra n. 10, at 55.
141 Id. at 70 (quoting Walter Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action
64 (U.S.C. Press 1989)).
142 Rideout, supra n. 10, at 70.
143 See supra sec. V.F.
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runaway federal government. The outcome of the case depends very much
on which story the judge chose to listen to.144
Suppose the judge decided that the case was about the broken healthcare system. The states did not really dispute that in their briefs; their
“solution” was completely laissez-faire: to let individuals make their own
choices and to let the market decide. In that contest, the United States’
complex and well-supported story about how the health-care system really
works and how it leaves millions of people at risk for potentially catastrophic expenses is pretty compelling. The court would likely want to
protect the weak Everyperson companion and rule in favor of the United
States.
But the two judges who heard the state government cases instead
viewed the dispute as one of federalism: should the federal government’s
power extend as far as the PPACA seems to push it? In Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, the United States ﬁled a Motion to Dismiss on
several grounds, including claims that the Commonwealth of Virginia
lacked standing to sue, that the controversy was unripe, and that since the
PPACA was enforced through a tax measure, the suit was barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act.145 The trial court rejected all of these claims146 and
instead decided the matter on competing Motions for Summary
Judgment.147 In framing the issue before it, the trial court ﬁrst
acknowledged the federalism story told by the state by reporting that the
Commonwealth was attempting to protect its sovereignty from
encroachment by Congress, invoking the Tenth Amendment.148 But the
court began its recitation of the United States’ version of the story (which
told of the broken health-care system) by saying, “The Secretary prefaces
her response with an acknowledgment that the debate over the constitutionality of the [PP]ACA has evolved into a polemic mix of political

144 In fairness, the courts that decided the private-plaintiff cases also had a choice of which story to listen to. In the one
private-plaintiff case in which the trial judge determined that the PPACA violated the Commerce Clause, the opinion began
by framing the issue in terms of the federalism story:
As a threshold matter, I emphasize, as Judge Vinson emphasized in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, [citation omitted], that this case is not about whether the Health Care Act merely treats the symptoms or
cures the disease which has so clearly afflicted our health care system. Nor is it about the exhaustive efforts of Congress
to document and to project the increasing costs of health care services or to pinpoint discriminatory practices associated with pre-existing conditions.
Rather, this case concerns the precise parameters of Congress’s enumerated authority under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. Speciﬁcally, the issue is whether Congress can invoke its Commerce Clause power to
compel individuals to buy insurance as a condition of lawful citizenship or residency.
Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
145 Memo. in Support of Def. Mot. to Dismiss, 2010 WL 2315702 (May 24, 2010).
146 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).
147 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
148 Id. at 772.
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controversy and legal analysis.”149 There is little doubt from the way the
court framed the competing stories as to which story the court heard most
clearly.150
The trial court in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services was even more explicit about saying which story was
important to it:
I emphasized once before, but it bears repeating again: this case is not
about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or whether it will solve
or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care system. In fact, it is
not really about our health care system at all. It is principally about our
federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding the
Constitutional role of the federal government.
James Madison, the chief architect of our federalist system, once
famously observed:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difﬁculty lies in this: you must ﬁrst enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.151

In the federalism story, it is the state governments who are weak and
in need of the judge’s protection; the judges provided that protection. So
why did the judges choose to decide the case based on the federalism story
told by the state governments instead of the health-care system story told
by the United States?

149 Id.
150 My objective in this project was to study the differing trial court rulings in this nationwide litigation. But the story
behind the case is interesting on the appellate court level, too. Whereas the trial judge in the Commonwealth of Virginia litigation heard the federalism story, the Fourth Circuit heard quite a different story, indeed. Since the trial judge’s prior ruling
denying the United States’ Motion to Dismiss was an interlocutory order, the issues of standing, ripeness and the applicability
of the Anti-Injunction Act were preserved for appeal and were heard along with the appeal on the merits of the Commerce
Clause issue. The Fourth Circuit held that the Commonwealth of Virginia lacked standing to sue and therefore dismissed the
action, vacating the trial court’s decision on the merits. Virginia ex rel Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d at 266–73. In so doing,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the federalism story advanced by the Commonwealth, holding that the Virginia Health Care
Freedom Act, adopted the day after the PPACA,
does not confer on Virginia a sovereign interest in challenging the individual mandate. . . . [T]he VHCFA regulates
nothing and provides for the administration of no state program. Instead, it simply purports to immunize Virginia
citizens from federal law. In doing so, the VHCFA reflects no exercise of “sovereign power,” for Virginia lacks the
sovereign authority to nullify federal law.
Id. at 270. Why the Court of Appeals paid attention to a different story than did the trial judge is an interesting question but
beyond the scope of this article.
151 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (quoting The Federalist No. 51,
at 348 (James Madison) (N.Y. Heritage Press ed., 1945)).
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Here is where the effect of the judges’ preexisting worldviews cannot
be denied. Since the judge gets to decide which story will provide the
battleﬁeld on which the contest is decided, a judge’s inclination to favor
one sort of story over another may prove decisive. That is to say, judges
who are inclined to favor stories about rules and processes may choose to
decide the cases based on the federalism issue; judges who favor stories
about humans and their individual struggles may choose to decide the
case on the broken health-care-system issue.
Judges, like other humans, have a variety of world-views. Some are
conservatives, resistant to change; others are more liberal, accepting of
change. Conservatives and liberals respond very differently to different
stimuli. Stories featuring certain types of heroes told to somebody with a
conservative world view will likely yield a very different reaction than the
same story told to somebody with a more liberal world view. Stated
another way, conservatives and liberals will understand the case, and
choose the heroes they empathize with, differently.
But that doesn’t mean that the judges’ decisions are all about politics
and that the outcome of a case is determined as soon as one type of judge
or another is assigned to hear the case. What it does mean, however, is
that the advocate needs to choose the story she tells carefully. More
importantly, once she knows which judge has been assigned to hear a case,
she needs to learn as much as she can about that judge’s background and
prior rulings, looking for evidence of what kinds of stories the judge
responds to. Then she needs to carefully choose heroic archetypes for her
client and to craft the story in such a way as to appeal to the judge’s
favored worldview.
I also don’t mean to suggest any of the ﬁve trial court judges in this
litigation consciously chose which story to listen to in order to decide the
case in a way that favored their own political views. In fact, I very much
doubt that they did; it is far more likely that the judges, at least
consciously, believed that they were applying the law fairly and impartially
to an agreed set of facts. But heroic archetypes are embedded deep within
each of us; they work at the level of the unconscious. We usually cannot
control which one gets triggered when we are exposed to different stimuli.
The same stimuli may subconsciously evoke different heroic archetypes in
different people, as they may in different judges. The advocate’s difﬁcult
task is to try to determine which archetype a particular judge is most likely
to see and to favor, then tell a story to evoke that archetype.
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VI. Conclusion
Narrative reasoning likely has some effect in every case, and potentially a
dispositive effect in cases wherein the rules of law don’t readily yield a
clear answer. Since reasonable minds may easily differ on the interpretation of the Commerce Clause and the precedents that have interpreted
it, I contend that narrative reasoning likely played a role in the differing
decisions reached by all of the judges who have handled these cases to
date.
The stories that parties tell in their briefs are not all that helps to
persuade a judge. Stories are important persuasive tools, but their effect is
hardly the most important factor in every case. A case with a very
powerful narrative will ultimately not succeed if the rules of law don’t
support the relief requested.
Not surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in this litigation.152 I do not wish to make any prediction here
about how that case may turn out; in fact, the way that the Supreme Court
hears and responds to stories is likely very different from how trial courts
and Courts of Appeal respond to stories.153 My only bit of advice to the
advocates who will argue that case is this: Stories matter.

Appendix A
Some scholarship that grew out of presentations at one of
the Applied Legal Storytelling Conferences (as of September 2011)154
A. Law review articles
Paula Abrams, We the People and Other Constitutional Tales: Teaching
Constitutional Meaning Through Narrative, 41 The Law Teacher 247 (2007).
Michael Blissenden, Using Storytelling as a Teaching Model in a Law School: The
Experience in an Australian Context, 41 The Law Teacher 260 (2007).

152 Petitions for certiorari were granted in several of the cases, including the major case in which twenty-six state attorneys
general joined as plaintiffs: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). A
summary of the Supreme Court ﬁlings and their dispositions can be found at the Supreme Court ofﬁcial website,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/ppaaca.aspx (last viewed April 18, 2012). Oral arguments in the cases were heard over
three days, from March 26 through 28, 2012; links to audio recording of those arguments can be found at the Supreme Court
website, id. A ruling is expected by June, 2012.
153 One respected scholar has described the Supreme Court as a “political court” and therefore attentive to different modes
of persuasion than other courts. Posner, supra n. 135, at 269–323.
154 Thanks to Ruth Anne Robbins, one of the organizers for all three of the Applied Legal Storytelling conferences to date,
for allowing me to reproduce this bibliography, which she ﬁrst created. I have added a few more articles published since she
ﬁrst compiled this listing.
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Incorporating Critical Strategies that Support Learning Lawyering Skills for
the Practice of Law in a Global Environment, 41 The Law Teacher 275 (2007).
Anna P. Hemingway, The Ethical Obligations of Lawyers, Law Students and Law
Professors Telling Stories on Web Logs, 41 The Law Teacher 287 (2007).
Robert McPeake, Fitting Stories into Professional Legal Education—The Missing
Ingredient, 41 The Law Teacher 303 (2007).
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Teacher, 41 The Law Teacher 314 (2007).
Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Legal Storytelling, 14 Leg. Writing
17 (2008).
Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 Leg.
Writing 17 (2008).
J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 Leg. Writing 53 (2008).
James Parry Eyster, Using Significant Moments and Obtuse Objects to Enhance
Advocacy, 14 Leg. Writing 87 (2008).
Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 Leg.
Writing 127 (2008).
Elyse Pepper, The Case for “Thinking Like a Filmmaker”: Using Lars von Trier’s
Dogville as a Model for Writing a Statement of Facts, 14 Leg. Writing 171
(2008).
Mary Ellen Maatman, Justice Formation from Generation to Generation: Atticus
Finch and the Stories Lawyers Tell Their Children, 14 Leg. Writing 207 (2008).
Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective Personal
Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 Leg. Writing 249 (2008).
Patricia Grande Montana, Better Revision: Encouraging Student Writers to See
Through the Eyes of the Reader, 14 Leg. Writing 291 (2008).
Laurie Shanks, Whose Story is it Anyway?—Guiding Students To Client-Centered
Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 509 (2008).
Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . . The Use of
Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev.
1213 (2010).
Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of
Story, 7 J. ALWD 1 (2010).
Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ALWD 37 (2010).
Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical
Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. ALWD 63 (2010).
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Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation
between Church & State,” 7 J. ALWD 123 (2010).
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ALWD 203 (2010).
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Narrative and Legal Ethics, 7 J. ALWD 229 (2010).
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Storytelling Through Repeated Experiences, 16 Leg. Writing 117 (2010).
Jeanne M. Kaiser, When the Truth and the Story Collide: What Legal Writers Can
Learn from the Experience of Non-Fiction Writers about the Limits of Legal
Storytelling, 16 Leg. Writing 163 (2010).
Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing
Advice, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 1 (2010).
Harriet N. Katz, Stories and Students: Mentoring Professional Development, 60 J.
Leg. Ed. 675 (2011).
Ian Gallacher, Thinking Like Non-Lawyers: Why Empathy is a Core Lawyering Skill
and Why Legal Education Should Change to Reflect Its Importance, 8 J. ALWD
109 (2011).

B. Book chapters
This section lists chapters of the book The Law & Harry Potter (Carolina Academic
Press 2010), all of which were presented at one of the first two Applied
Storytelling conferences.
Mary Beth Beazley, Which Spell? Learning to Think Like a Wizard.
Eric J. Gouvin, The Magic of Money and Banking.
Sue Liemer, Bots and Gringotts: Anglo-Saxon Legal References in Harry Potter.
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Gringotts: The Role of Banks in Harry Potter’s
Wizarding World.
Aaron Schwabach, Harry Potter and the Unforgiveable Curses.
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